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Abstract
Job search assistance programs are part of active labor market policy in many countries.
The main characteristics of these activities are an intensified counseling and a job search
monitoring; in addition, several countries integrate courses teaching further skills into the
programs. Job search assistance programs should help to increase the employment chances
and to reduce the unemployment duration of the job seekers. In this paper, recent empirical
findings from evaluation studies for 9 European countries are reviewed and implications with
regard to the effectiveness of the activities are derived. To make the findings of various stud-
ies evaluating the different programs comparable, the methodological issues of the empirical
approaches applied to estimate the causal effects of the programs are discussed in detail. In
addition, relevant characteristics of the unemployment insurance systems, the assignment
process, and the content of programs are presented to derive meaningful implications. The
comparison of the programs takes account of individual effects and, if available, cost benefit
considerations. The results show that job search assistance programs tend to provide an
effective means to reduce individual unemployment, particularly if provided as combinations
of intensive counseling and short-term training courses.
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1 Introduction
In many European countries, programs to activate the unemployed (active labor market policy,
ALMP) play an important role within labor market policy. Designed as selective policies that
are (more or less) targeted to well-defined groups of the labor force, programs aim at reducing
individual unemployment by offering a variety of activities such as training courses, employment
subsidies, or public employment services. The core argument for offering ALMP is the economic
reasoning that promoting employment (or activities directly aiming at employment) is better
than compensating unemployment (by generous unemployment benefits). In that sense, the
main purposes of ALMP are not only to improve employment outcomes, to lower benefit rates
and the benefit dependency rates, but also to contribute to the quality and productivity of jobs
and to strengthen social cohesion (European Commission, 2006). However, high and persistent
levels of unemployment and a growing share of long-term unemployment lead to budgetary
pressure and to doubts about the effectiveness of ALMP in many countries. Accompanied by
demographic change (ageing societies) and new economic challenges (e.g. globalization) this
has forced politicians, economists, and society to critically evaluate the efforts in labor market
policy programs.
Therefore, the number of studies providing empirical evaluations of the effects of various ALMP
programs in European countries has risen steadily over the last decade. This development
was accompanied and/or in part enabled by a growing availability of better data (particularly,
micro register data), overcoming limitations of earlier household or labor force surveys, as well as
improvements in evaluation methodology to estimate treatment effects from non-experimental
data leading to more reliable estimation results. Nevertheless, European Commission (2006) still
argued that an ‘evaluation culture’ for labor market policies is still missing in many European
countries and contrasts markedly with the practice in other countries like the US or Canada.
However, the situation improves as evaluation studies become more common using state-of-the-
art evaluation methods to identify the causal effects of programs and better data.
The overviews by Martin and Grubb (2001), Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstro¨m (2001) and
Kluve (2006) show that the doubts of the public about the effectiveness of ALMP programs
correlate positively with the findings from the scientific evaluations: The majority of programs,
in particular employment subsidies and longer-term vocational training programs, tend to be
ineffective in reducing unemployment and bringing people back to employment, or result in
modest positive improvements of the labor market situation of the participants. The budgetary
pressure together with this evidence at hand led to a shift of the single activities within ALMP in
recent years. Programs for identification of needs, job search assistance, guidance, and training
as part of a personalized action plan have become more important within the mixture of ALMP
in a number of countries. The main reasons are the large degree of flexibility, the lower expen-
diture relative to more traditional and longer lasting programs, and the possibility to commit
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job seekers to report actions more frequently. Recently, these job search assistance programs in
Europe have been analyzed in a number of empirical studies. However, the evidence is dispersed
as studies differ in a number of respects. First, the programs offered are heterogenous across
countries with regard to the design and the duration, i.e. some programs provide intensified
job search assistance via counseling and monitoring only whereas others comprise job training
courses in addition. Second, some programs are addressed to all job seekers whereas others are
explicitly targeted to certain groups, e.g. young unemployed or long-term unemployed. In the
latter case, programs may prove effective for the groups in focus but generalizing the findings
to other groups of job seekers could be problematic. Third, a number of different estimation
methods are applied to evaluate programs’ effects in the available empirical studies. All these
differences have to be regarded when comparing the results.
The aim of this survey is to condense the findings from recent evaluation studies of European
job search assistance programs. Two questions lay at the core of this paper. The first is:
How effective are job search assistance programs in European countries in bringing people
back to work or shortening the duration of unemployment? And according to that, the second
question asks: What are the reasons and determinants of effective - or respectively - less effective
programs? By and large, nine countries could be considered in this survey: Austria, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.
For all of these countries, at least one empirical study evaluating the effects of the job search
assistance program is available. For some countries, programs have been analyzed by several
authors. As the focus of this paper is the cross-country comparison of European programs, I
have selected a number of representative studies with regard to the empirical findings and the
estimation method applied in these cases.1
Moreover, I do not consider programs conducted in the US. A comprehensive overview on these
programs similar to the kind considered here is provided by Meyer (1995). From his summary
of five different job search assistance programs he concludes that the activities provided are an
effective means to shorten unemployment duration and could be cost-efficient. However, with
regard to the reasons he could not disentangle whether positive effects are due to a stricter
enforcement of job seekers or due to a frequent verification of the job search behavior. Whereas
the first refers to an improvement of the job search abilities, the latter coincides with a stricter
monitoring and sanctioning of benefits if job seekers do not cooperate. In particular the lat-
ter aspect of programs exhibits some threat effect of participation to job seekers. Fortunately,
Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Descheˆnes (2005) complement the findings of Meyer (1995) by an-
alyzing a job search program containing only the monitoring component of the program. The
empirical results clearly indicate that solely increasing the monitoring of the job seekers pro-
vides no means to improve labor market outcomes. With regard to the differences in the design
of the European programs reviewed here, this evidence could be important. Therefore, I will
consider the evidence of the US in the discussion.
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To make results comparable across countries, a particular emphasis is spent on the three aspects
mentioned above. To do so, I will first review the main characteristics of the empirical methods
including the empirically non-testable identifying assumptions (section 2). This review should
help to understand heterogeneity in the estimates and the limitations of the different approaches.
After that, a summary of important characteristics of the countries’ labor market systems and
the programs considered is provided (section 3). Based on this preparation, in section 4 the
main findings of the studies are compared. Although job search assistance programs in Europe
tend to exhibit positive effects in terms of increased employment and a reduced unemployment
duration, the picture is mixed and not all programs provided are successful. The reasons for
these differences will be explored and discussed in section 5. A short conclusion is given in the
final section.
2 Evaluation methods
The crucial task of program evaluation is to identify the causal effect of participation in the
program in study on an outcome variable, e.g. the duration of unemployment, the probability
of employment, or the earnings. On the micro level, the fundamental problem of this task lies
in the missing counterfactual situation of participation. In the simplest case, persons could only
choose (whether on themselves, selected by a caseworker, or upon some specific rule makes no
difference at this point) to participate in a program or not. Clearly, no person is observable in
both states at the same point of time. To solve this problem, experimental and non-experimental
approaches are suggested in the literature that both require non-testable assumptions to con-
struct the missing counterfactual. Without collecting data specifically designed to test these
assumptions (see Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1996) no validation of the unbiasedness
of the estimates is possible. With regard to the evaluation of job search assistance programs in
Europe, three approaches (experimental estimators, propensity score matching estimators, and
multivariate duration models) have been used and will be discussed below. To start with I will
first review the framework for the evaluation of treatment effects.
2.1 Potential outcome approach and treatment effect
The standard model in the microeconometric evaluation literature is the so-called potential
outcome approach which has been variously attributed to Neyman (1923; 1935), Fisher (1935),
Roy (1951), Quandt (1972; 1988) or Rubin (1974). In the simple form, the model considers two
possible states of the world.2 An individual i is imagined to either participate in a program or
not. Let Y 1i and Y
0
i denote the potential outcomes corresponding to the states, where 1 denotes
treatment and 0 non-treatment. According to this definition, the individual causal effect of
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treatment is defined as the difference of the two potential outcomes, i.e.
Δi = Y 1i − Y 0i . (1)
However, since the individual cannot be in both states of the world at the same time, the actual
observed outcome for each individual i can be written as:
Yi = Y 1i ·Di + (1−Di) · Y 0i , (2)
where Di ∈ {0, 1} is a binary treatment indicator, with D = 1 denoting participation and
D = 0 denoting non-participation.3 To complete the notation, let X denote variables that are
unaffected by treatment – the so-called attributes by Holland (1986). Eq. (2) makes clear that
one of the outcomes is unobservable for each individual, i.e. only Y 1i or Y
0
i is observable. For
that reason, there is no opportunity to calculate individual effects directly from the data, and
Δi is not observed for anyone.
Since direct estimation of the individual effect of treatment in eq. (1) is impossible, evaluation
has to focus on population averages of gains from treatment. The most common parameter
of interest in the empirical literature is the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT).4
The ATT is defined as
ΔATT = E(Δ|D = 1) = E(Y 1 − Y 0|D = 1)
= E(Y 1|D = 1)− E(Y 0|D = 1), (3)
which is the difference of the expected outcomes with and without treatment for participants.
As it focuses directly on the actual participants, it determines the realized gross gain for this
group (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). Thus, its importance for policy makers becomes
obvious as programs are generally targeted to certain groups; and by comparing the program
effect with its costs, the ATT is a reasonable approach to measure the performance of the
program, i.e. deciding whether the program is a success or not (see Heckman and Robb, 1985b,
and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997).
To render the model useful for causal analysis, one has to invoke the stable unit treatment
value assumption (SUTVA, see e.g. Rubin, 1986). SUTVA rules out any cross-effects or gen-
eral equilibrium effects that may occur among potential program participants because of their
participation decision (Lechner, 2001). In other words, the potential outcomes of an individual
depend on the individual’s participation decision only and are not affected by the treatment
status of other individuals. Furthermore, whether an individual participates or not does not
depend on the participation decision of other individuals. This additional feature excludes
peer-effects (Sianesi, 2004). If one is willing to estimate the effect of the program for a person
drawn randomly from the participants sample, those effects are negligible and SUTVA could be
assumed to be fulfilled.
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In addition, Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) point out that microeconometric evaluation
concentrates on direct effects only. A full evaluation of the program of interest would require an
enumeration of all outcomes of interest for every person, both in the actual state of the world
as well as in the alternative state(s). In the most general view, almost everyone in a modern
economy participates in each social program either directly or indirectly. Direct effects affect the
situation of only those persons enrolled to the programs. Effects that do not result from partic-
ipation directly are defined as indirect effects. The indirect effects could occur for participants
and non-participants. For example, participants may pay taxes or unemployment insurance
contributions to support the program just as persons who do not participate. Furthermore,
indirect effects occur for persons with whom the participants compete in the labor market and
for the firms that hire the participants. The problem of the indirect effects is ignored in the
econometric and statistical evaluation literature, and treatment outcomes are equated with the
direct outcome Y 1 in the program state; no treatment outcomes are equated with the direct
outcome Y 0 in the no-program state. However, this is a crucial assumption in the traditional
evaluation literature (Heckman and Smith, 1998). This should be kept in mind when discussing
the results of the job search assistance programs below.
2.2 Experimental estimators
It becomes obvious from eq. (3) that the second term on the right-hand side is unobservable.
The term describes the hypothetical outcome of the participants if they had not participated
in the program. In an experimental evaluation where participants are assigned randomly to the
program or a control group, the missing counterfactual data of the treatment can be derived
by using information from that control group. The hypothetical outcome of participants if they
had not participated would not differ from the expected outcome of the non-participants, i.e.
E(Y 0|D = 1) = E(Y 0|D = 0). (4)
Therefore, it is possible to approximate the counterfactual outcome of the participants by the
non-participants’ outcomes. The ATT can easily be computed since the data on program
participants identify the mean outcome in the treated state, E(Y 1|D = 1), and the randomized-
out comparison provides the direct estimate for E(Y 0|D = 1) (Smith and Todd, 2005).5
Social experiments have been seen as the ideal way to evaluate the impacts of programs in par-
ticular in the US (Smith, 2000b). In his survey, Smith (2000a) notes a set of advantages of social
experiments over standard non-experimental methods. First, they are easy to explain to policy
makers because most educated persons understand the issue of random assignment. Second, as
becomes obvious by eq. (4), social experiments produce consistent estimates of the impact of
treatment on the treated and they are less controversial than non-experimental methods. Third,
for conductors of experiments it is more difficult to cheat, i.e. to produce the impact they want,
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because the evaluators could not choose from a set of estimators. Fourth, experiments provide
an opportunity to examine the efficacy of different alternative non-experimental estimators.6
However, social experiments also have some important drawbacks. First, they cannot address
many questions of interest to researchers or policy makers. As they generate choice-based,
endogenously stratified samples that are difficult to use in any other economic question, they
only allow the evaluation of the impact of treatment on the treated for one program with one
set of participants and eligibility rules (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). Second, social
experiments may be hard to accomplish as they entail high costs and ethical issues concerning
the use of random assignment. Further practical problems with the implementation of social
experiments are mentioned in the literature: the problem of non-compliance, the problem of
substitution bias, and of randomization bias. Non-compliance occurs if persons assigned to the
treatment group do not participate or if members assigned to the control group participate in
the program. Selective non-compliance may lead to biased estimates of the program effects
(see Bijwaard and Ridder, 2000). Randomization bias describes the phenomenon if persons
selected for the program differ from persons who would participate in the program under usual
conditions, i.e. the effects of the program are estimated for an unrepresentative sample. Closely
related to that, social experiments may also lead to non-representative estimates due to a
Hawthorne effect. In that case, people are aware of the experimental situation and change their
behavior. Finally, a substitution bias could occur if members of the control group participate
in similar programs to the experimental treatment (see Heckman and Smith, 1995).
2.3 Non-experimental estimators
Whereas in the experimental situation the randomized-out control group provides a direct es-
timate of the non-treated outcome of the treated, there is no such group available in non-
experimental data. Therefore, in a non-experimental evaluation, analysts must replace the
missing data with data on non-participants along with additional assumptions invoked when
using the method of social experiments since no direct estimate for this counterfactual mean
is available and eq. (4) will usually not hold, i.e. E(Y 0|D = 1) = E(Y 0|D = 0). Using the
unadjusted outcomes of the non-participants to approximate the missing counterfactual in the
ATT will lead to selection or evaluation bias:
ΔATT = E(Y 1|D = 1)− E(Y 0|D = 0)
= E(Y 1 − Y 0|D = 1) + {E(Y 0|D = 1)− E(Y 0|D = 0)}.︸ ︷︷ ︸
= B
(5)
The term in the curly brackets is the selection bias, B, i.e. the difference between the hypothet-
ical and actual outcomes after non-participation. The reason why this selection bias could not
be assumed to be zero with non-experimental data is that participants and non-participants
would also have had different non-treatment outcomes even in the absence of the program.
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An important share of the non-experimental evaluation literature deals with providing estima-
tors for average treatment effects of receiving or not receiving a binary treatment under the
assumption that the treatment satisfies some kind of exogeneity. This assumption, variously
referred to as selection on observables by Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger (1980), unconfound-
edness by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), or conditional independence assumption by Lechner
(1998) denotes that the receipt of treatment is independent of the potential outcomes with
and without treatment if certain observable attributes are held constant. In his review on
non-parametric estimators that are based on this exogeneity assumption, Imbens (2004) dis-
tinguishes five classes of estimators that comprise regression, matching on covariates, methods
based on the propensity score, combinations of these approaches, and Bayesian methods.
However, in particular the matching estimator has become a popular approach to estimate
causal treatment effects. The main reasons for the popularity of the matching estimator are its
underlying idea as well as the simplicity of explanation (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999).
Therefore, matching estimators are frequently used for program evaluation and in consulting
business.
Propensity score matching
The basic idea of the matching approach is to find in a large group of non-participants those
individuals who are similar to the participants in all relevant pre-treatment characteristics X
(‘statistical twins’). For that reason, the method appeals to the intuitive principle that it is
possible to ‘adjust away’ differences between participants and non-participants using the avail-
able regressors (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). Originated in the statistical literature7,
matching thus generates a comparison group that resembles an experimental control group in
one key respect: conditional on X, the distribution of the counterfactual outcome, Y 0, of the
participants is the same as the observed distribution of the outcome Y 0 of the comparison
group (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). In the method of matching, the construction of
the correct sample counterpart (for the missing information on the treated outcomes had they
not participated) consists in pairing each program participant with one or more members of a
comparison group (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002). Therefore, the matching approach allows
to compare treated and non-treated outcomes directly without having to impose structure on
the problem. This is the analogy to random assignment in a (social) experiment.
An advantage of the method of matching is its generality due to the non-parametric nature
of the approach, i.e. no particular distribution has to be assumed. Furthermore, matching
is flexible and may be combined with other methods to produce more accurate estimates of
the treatment effects allowing for less restrictive assumptions. One example is the so-called
conditional difference-in-differences (DiD) suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997)
that combines matching and the DiD estimator. For the evaluation of the job search assistance
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programs, this approach is used by Centeno, Centeno, and Novo (2006) for Portugal and by
Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir, and van Reenen (2004) for the UK. However, since matching
methods concern themselves solely with selection of observable variables to solve the selection
problem, they require very rich data in order to make the estimates of the treatment effects
credible (Smith, 2000a).
The key assumption in the statistical matching literature for the construction of a valid com-
parison group is that conditional on all relevant pre-treatment characteristics, X, the potential
outcomes, Y 1, Y 0, are independent of the treatment assignment, D (see Rubin, 1977). If the sole
parameter of interest is the average effect of treatment on the treated and not the impact on the
distribution, for identification of the parameter the conditional mean independence assumption
has to be invoked:
E(Y 0|X,D = 1) = E(Y 0|X,D = 0) = E(Y 0|X), (6)
where  denotes independence, and X are covariates that are unaffected by the treatment. As
a consequence of eq. 6, the distribution of non-treatment outcomes
F (Y 0|X,D = 1) = F (Y 0|X,D = 0) = F (Y 0|X) (7)
is independent of the treatment assignment (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). Further-
more, to guarantee that a participant for each non-participant is found, a common support
condition is required:
Pr(D = 1|X) < 1. (8)
Eq. 8 implies that there is an overlap in the distribution of X between the treated and the
non-treated group.8 Furthermore, it prevents X to be a perfect predictor for treatment or
non-treatment respectively. Failure to the common support assumption would lead to biased
estimates of the treatment impact as it cannot be identified for all values of X (Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). In that case, matching can only be performed within the common
support of treated and non-treated individuals. In consequence, the estimated ATT has then to
be re-defined for those treated falling in the common support (Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi,
2004).
If eq. 6 and 8 hold, the ATT in eq. (3) can be rewritten for the matching estimator following
Smith and Todd (2005) as
ΔATTMAT = E(Y
1 − Y 0|D = 1)
= E(Y 1|D = 1)− EX|D=1{EY (Y 0|X,D = 1)}
= E(Y 1|D = 1)− EX|D=1{EY (Y 0|X,D = 0)}. (9)
The first term, E(Y 1|D = 1), can be estimated from the observed outcomes of the treated
individuals; the second term, EX|D=1{EY (Y 0|X,D = 0)}, can be estimated from the observed
outcomes of the (conditional on the X for the treated) matched non-treated.9
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Matching on X can become hazardous when X is of high dimension (‘curse of dimensionality’,
see e.g. Pagan and Ullah, 1999). To deal with this dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) suggest to use balancing scores, b(X). Balancing scores are functions of the
relevant covariates X, such that the conditional distribution of X given b(X) is independent of
assignment to treatment, i.e. the same for the treated and the non-treated individuals
X D|b(X). (10)
This means that for treated and non-treated individuals with the same balancing score the
distributions of the covariates X are balanced across the treated and the non-treated group.
One possible balancing score is the probability of participating in a program, i.e. the propensity
score p(X) = E(D = 1|X) that summarizes the information of the relevant covariates X into
a scalar index function. Therefore, all biases due to observable covariates can be removed by
conditioning solely on the propensity score.
When the propensity score, p(X), is known, the curse of dimensionality for the X can be
eliminated; and solving the fundamental evaluation problem requires only to pair treated and
non-treated individuals who have the same p(X) as this balances the distributions of X across
groups. When the propensity score is unknown, it could be estimated by parametric, semi-
parametric or non-parametric methods. However, non-parametric estimation is not preferable
since the curse of dimensionality will reappear in the estimation of the propensity score. There-
fore, much of the empirical literature uses probit or logit models.
As noted above, the idea of the matching estimator is to find for each treated individual i com-
parable persons j from the comparison group. Let N1 denote the number of treated individuals
(D = 1) and N0 the number of comparison individuals (D = 0). Matches are constructed based
on a neighborhood C(p(Xi)), where p(Xi) is the propensity score for individual i. Possible
matches (neighbors) to treated person i are persons j in the comparison sample whose propen-
sity scores are in the neighborhood C(p(Xi)), i.e. p(Xj) ∈ C(p(Xi)). The persons matched to
individual i are those in the set Ai, where Ai = {j ∈ D = 0|p(Xj) ∈ C(p(Xi))} (Smith and
Todd, 2005). With 0  W (i, j)  1 defining the weight placed on the non-treated observation
j for forming a comparison with observation i, the general form of the matching estimator for
the ATT is given by
ΔATTMAT =
1
N1
N1∑
i∈{D=1}
⎡
⎣Y 1i −
N0∑
j∈{D=0}
W (i, j)Y 0j
⎤
⎦ . (11)
The weights always satisfy
∑N0
i∈{D=0} W (i, j) = 1 ∀ i, i.e. the total weight of all comparisons
sums up to one for each treated individual. The literature provides a variety of alternative
matching schemes (e.g. nearest-neighbor, kernel density, caliper) to estimate the treatment
effects. The different matching estimators vary in the weights attached to the members of the
comparison group (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998).10
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Whether the identifying assumption holds or not has raised some discussion recently. The
critical question is that the optimizing behavior of the decision makers, e.g. the individual or
the caseworkers, precludes their choices being independent of the potential outcomes. Imbens
(2004) presents three arguments concerning the reliability of the assumptions. These argu-
ments comprise statistical, data-descriptive, and empirical questions as well as the occurrence
of selection on unobservable factors. First, as the natural starting point for any evaluation is
the comparison of average outcomes for treated and non-treated individuals, the quality of the
comparison may be enhanced by adjusting away any difference in outcomes for differences in
exogenous attributes, where attributes are exogenous in the sense that they are not affected
by treatment. Although this may not lead to the final word on efficacy of the treatment, its
absence would seem difficult to rationalize if one seriously attempts to understand the evidence
regarding the impact of the treatment (Imbens, 2004). Second, the empirical question of the
evaluation asks which individuals should be compared. Therefore, economic theory on the deci-
sion process of treatment may provide some guidance in choosing the variables that need to be
adjusted for versus those that do not need to be adjusted for. The conditional mean indepen-
dence assumption is fulfilled if the researcher observes all variables that need to be adjusted for
(relevant covariates). However, if variables that are needed to be adjusted for are not observed,
strong assumptions will be required for the identification of the effects of interest. Third, even
when agents optimally choose their treatment, two agents with the same values for observed
characteristics may differ in their treatment choices. The unconfoundedness assumption must
not be invalidated in this case if the differences in the choice are driven by unobserved factors
that are themselves unrelated to the outcomes of interest. This may be the case if the objective
of the potential participant to participate is distinct from the outcome that is of interest for
the evaluator. This third argument is in line with the discussion of Heckman, LaLonde, and
Smith (1999) about the validation of the outcomes. Since different persons may value the same
state of the world differently even if they experience the same ‘objective’ outcomes, this must
be considered in the economic model. A good example is a program that is in part due to pater-
nalistic or altruistic preferences. In that case, allocation of individuals may be guided by equity
concerns, whereas evaluation may focus on program efficiency. While the efficiency criterion
focusses on maximizing the social return to a public program investment, i.e. it concentrates
on groups for whom the impact is largest, the equity criterion aims at groups who are most in
‘need of services’.
Multivariate duration models
An alternative approach of program evaluation that has been applied frequently in the context
of job search assistance programs are duration models. In contrast to propensity score matching,
longitudinal information is used to identify the treatment effects. By imposing more structure
to solve the selection problem, consideration of observable and unobservable influences becomes
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possible. However, to take account of possibly endogenous participation, the recent literature
suggests the use of multivariate models where the interdependence of the transitions of interest
(transition into program and transition into employment) are estimated simultaneously.
A useful multivariate duration framework for the evaluation of treatment effects is introduced
by Abbring and van den Berg (2003) based on the population of inflows into unemployment.
To illustrate the approach some further notation is useful. The duration until the individual
enters employment (Te) and the duration until he/she joins a program (Tp) are measured from
the point of time an individual enters unemployment. Te and Tp are assumed to be non-
negative and continuous random variables with realizations denoted as te and tp. The durations
Te and Tp are assumed to vary with time-invariant observable characteristics (x) and time-
invariant unobservable characteristics (ve, vp). For the observable characteristics, no exclusion
restrictions are necessary, i.e. the observable characteristics could be the same for both durations.
In addition, unobserved variables may affect the realizations of the event. Therefore, let ve
capture the unobserved heterogeneity of Te and vp the corresponding unobserved heterogeneity
of Tp.
The fundamental assumption of the model is that any dependence between Te and Tp conditional
on x and (ve, vp) stems from the causal effect of Tp on Te. Then, the joint distribution Te, Tp|x, v
is the product of the conditional distributions Te|Tp, x, v and Tp|x, v. Assuming further that
Te, Tp|x, v is absolutely continuous the conditional distributions in terms of their hazard rates
could be specified (Abbring and van den Berg, 2004). It is common, to specify both hazard
rates as mixed proportional hazard (MPH) models,
θe(t|tp, x, ve) = λe(t) exp(x′βe)veμ(t− tp, x, v)I(t>tp), (12)
θp(t|x, vp) = λp(t) exp(x′βp)vp. (13)
The hazard rate for the transition into employment (eq. 12) at time t consists of a baseline
hazard λe(t), a systematic part exp(x′βe), the unobserved heterogeneity term ve, and the treat-
ment effect μ(t − tp, x, v)I(t>tp). The underlying assumption of the MPH specification is that
duration dependence and individual heterogeneity enter the hazard multiplicatively (see Lan-
caster, 1979). The duration dependence, i.e. the shape of the hazard over time, is represented
by the baseline hazard. Individual heterogeneity is regarded by the systematic part and the un-
observed heterogeneity term. It is common to MPH models to specify the systematic part such
that θe(t|tp, x, ve) and θp(t|x, vp) are multiplicative in each element of x. The transition rate
from unemployment into program (eq. 13) is specified analogously with baseline hazard λp(t),
systematic part exp(x′βp) and unobserved heterogeneity term vp. In contrast to the method of
matching, assuming a MPH specification imposes more structure on the problem of potential
selection bias and causal effects of treatment. In particular, assuming proportionality of the
baseline hazard rates for all individuals and that the single factors affect the transition rate
multiplicatively has to be discussed carefully in each case.
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The treatment effect μ(t − tp, x, v)I(t>tp) represents the causal effect of tp on the hazard rate
θe(t|tp, x, ve), where I(t > tp) is an indicator function taking the value 1 if t > tp. The treat-
ment effect can be interpreted as a shift of the hazard rate by μ(t − tp, x, v) that is directly
associated with the expected remaining unemployment duration. In that sense, a positive treat-
ment effect will shorten the expected remaining unemployment duration. Hence, in the most
general specification, the treatment effect is allowed to depend on the time since treatment has
started (t− tp), on observable characteristics x, and on unobservable factors v. For this reason,
the model is very flexible with regard to consideration of different types of heterogeneity, but
computation is burdensome. Hence, many applications consider simpler cases of the treatment
effect only (depending on the time since treatment or observable characteristics only).
The basic assumption of the model is that any selectivity relates to observable and unobservable
factors. Technically, selectivity means that those individuals observed to receive a treatment at
tp are a non-random subset with respect to te. Whereas any selectivity conditional on observable
characteristics is captured by the systematic part in eq. (12), possible selection on unobservable
factors is captured by a dependence of ve and vp. Generally, it could be assumed that (ve, vp) is
a random vector with distribution function G(ve, vp) independent of x. If selectivity cannot be
fully captured by the observable characteristics, a dependence of the unobserved heterogeneity
terms will be observed. Then, the indicator function for the treatment effect appears as an
endogenous time-varying regressor.
A further important aspect of the model is the consideration of the information on the tim-
ing of the treatment within the unemployment spell. As Abbring and van den Berg (2003)
demonstrate, this additional information conveys useful information on the treatment effect in
the presence of selectivity. It enables a distinction to be made between time-invariant selection
effects embodied by observable and unobservable characteristics and a causal treatment effect
that becomes effective at the moment the treatment starts. A positive causal treatment effect
leads to a pattern where a transition into employment is typically realized very quickly after
a transition into treatment, no matter how long the elapsed duration of unemployment is. In
contrast, in the case of a selection effect there would be a correlation between the points in
time of the transitions into employment and the program. For example, a positive selection
effect results in a pattern where a quick transition into the program is followed by a quick
transition into employment, i.e. both transitions occur very rapidly after the unemployment
spell has started. Thus, the main difference between a treatment and a selectivity effect is that
the treatment effect affects the transition rate into employment only after treatment has been
realized whereas selectivity affects the transition rate everywhere.
Identification of the treatment effect requires that individuals do not anticipate future treat-
ments. Anticipatory effects are present if, for example, those individuals who are informed
about a future program reduce their search activity in order to wait for the program. In this
case, the hazard rate at t of an individual who anticipates a future treatment at time tp, will
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be different from the hazard rate of an individual who obtains an alternative treatment at time
t∗p for t  min{tp, t∗p}.11 Due to the anticipatory effect, the information on the timing of the
event would not be sufficient for identification since a causal change of the hazard occurs at the
moment the information shock of the treatment arrives. However, information on the timing
when people start to anticipate future participation is usually not available. Therefore, con-
vincing argumentation in favor of the no-anticipation assumption to hold in the specific case is
crucial. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the assumption of no anticipatory effects does not
rule out that individuals act on the determinants of Tp. In other words, individuals are allowed
to adjust their optimal behavior to the determinants of the treatment process, but not to the
realizations of tp. Abbring and van den Berg (2003) prove that with assumptions similar to
those made in standard univariate MPH models, the bivariate model in eqs. (12) and (13) and
the treatment effect in particular are identified. The identification is nonparametric, since no
parametric assumptions with respect to the baseline hazard and the unobserved heterogeneity
distribution are required.
Having outlined the empirical methods used to evaluate the treatment effects of job search
assistance programs, I will now turn to the characteristics of the programs and discuss the
results of the empirical studies thereafter.
3 Set-up and Eligibility
3.1 Registration, job search requirements, and participation
In recent years, many European economies have adopted policy measures that aim at increasing
the intensity and efficiency of job search and at mitigating the disincentive effects of unemploy-
ment compensation on labor supply. By adoption of these activities, a number of changes within
the mixture of labor market policy programs have been established: most European countries
have strengthened the counseling and job brokerage activities and have introduced measures to
check compliance with eligibility conditions and job search requirements. These requirements
usually cover a frequent reporting of the job search activities. If the requirements are not met,
sanctions by benefit revocation to enforce job search obligations and/or acceptance of suitable
job offers could be imposed. ALMP programs should force job seekers to search more actively
for work. In addition, most European countries have developed activation strategies to co-
ordinate benefit administration for public unemployment insurance and spending on ALMPs.
Economic theory and empirical results suggest significant interactions between unemployment
benefits and activation policies, meaning that disincentive effects associated with over-generous
unemployment benefits (high and long-lasting) can be, at least partially, counteracted by the
adoption of well-designed ALMPs.
However, although over-generous payments could lead to a potential abuse of the unemployment
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insurance system by claimants if they decide to reduce search efforts, this argumentation is
not without doubt. Meyer (1995) has raised this issue, an empirical investigation is provided
by Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Descheˆnes (2005). The results provide no support that failure
of the benefit claimants to actively seek for work has been caused by overpayments in the
unemployment insurance system. Despite that evidence, increasing the frequency of reporting
job search efforts is part of the job search assistance programs in all countries considered in this
review.
Include Table 1 about here
In order to make job search programs comparable across countries, the characteristics of the
unemployment insurance systems as well as the specific characteristics of the programs have to
be regarded. Table 1 summarizes selected characteristics of the unemployment systems and the
process of assignment to job search programs useful for the analysis.
A first obvious thing to note is that European countries’ labor market policy do not differ much
(anymore); an important reason for that may be seen in the collective agreements within the
European Union of the past years. In the majority of countries reviewed, benefit entitlement
starts with registration at the employment office (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, and
Portugal) or even before (France, the Netherlands, the UK). The only exception is Finland
where benefit entitlement starts after registration. In addition, most countries have adopted
strategies to intervene early in the unemployment spell. As becomes obvious from Table 1,
compulsory interviews during the first month of unemployment are common in most of the
countries, and typically a profiling is conducted and/or an individual action plan covering the
requirements of job search for the unemployed persons is set up. Moreover, unemployed persons
are forced to report the job search efforts frequently; in intervals ranging from every two weeks
(UK) to about every two months (Germany), but variable requirements are possible (Portugal)
as well.
With regard to the assignment rules of participation in ALMP programs there are some smaller
differences between countries. Although participation is compulsory in all countries if persons
are assigned to the program by the Public Employment Service, only Denmark, the Netherlands,
and the UK have compulsory participation after some specific duration of unemployment. Of
those three, the activation policy of the Netherlands postulates participation after one month of
unemployment already; the requirements in the UK are more relaxed with up to 22 months of
unemployment prior compulsory participation (for adults). Moreover, there are heterogeneous
requirements of participants to continue job search during participation. Continuing job search
is only required for participants in Denmark, Finland, and Germany; the other countries do not
impose comparable rules.
By and large, despite these smaller differences mentioned labor market policy is quite compara-
ble across countries. All countries favor the use of close monitoring of the job seekers comprising
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a frequently reporting of the activities. Moreover, if job seekers are assigned to ALMP programs,
participation is compulsory in the majority of cases. The requirement to continue job search
during participation imposed by some countries may speed up exit to employment. In contrast,
in countries that do not postulate continued job search during participation, locking-in effects
may be possible. Locking-in effects occur if participants reduce their job search efforts during
participation leading to a smaller transition probability of leaving unemployment (or the pro-
gram) for employment. However, in both cases the quality of jobs and the matching quality
has to be regarded. In sum, given the similarity of the European labor market systems, large
differences in impacts of the job search assistance programs due to the general framing of the
labor market policy could not be expected.
3.2 The programs
Although the job search programs in the different countries aim at shortening the duration of
unemployment by increasing the job chances of the job seekers (or the job match probability),
they differ in a number of respects. Some countries provide intensified counseling schemes
with frequent interviews over the unemployment spells only (Hungary, the Netherlands, and
RESTART program in the UK), whereas in other countries additional activation programs
or even qualification programs are an integral part of the job search assistance programs. A
key difference to more traditional ALMP programs (e.g., employment subsidies or vocational
training) is the modular set-up of the programs. For example, Denmark offers at first a job
search program for up to two weeks that could be extended by an activation program with a
possible duration of up to three months if the persons remains unemployed. In a similar way, job
search programs in Germany consist of three modules that could be arranged variably covering
job search assistance, intensified counseling and short-term training programs providing specific
skills and techniques. This set-up is comparable to the New Deal for Young People in the UK,
where a combination of individual job search assistance followed by subsidized courses is offered.
Similar combinations of programs are available in Austria, Finland, France, and Portugal.
Include Table 2 about here
Programs differ across countries with respect to the nature (whether programs are mandatory
or voluntary) and the duration. Most programs are mandatory for the participants, i.e. employ-
ment officers are allowed (or even forced) to sanction benefit entitlements of the job seekers if
they do not comply with participation. The only exception is Finland where programs are ar-
ranged with voluntary entitlement of participants. With regard to the duration of programs the
differences are quite large. Depending on the type of program (or module), programs’ durations
range from repeated half-an-hour interviews over some pre-defined interval of unemployment
(e.g. RESTART in the UK, or Counseling & Monitoring in the Netherlands) over one day profil-
ing courses (e.g. skill assessment in France) to on average two to four weeks programs teaching
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job search skills and further specific skills and techniques (e.g. in Germany, Finland, Denmark,
and France). In addition, due to the modular set-up of many programs lasting durations for up
to several months are possible. However, these longer program durations usually do not refer
to full-time courses but usually to repeated frequent meetings of job seekers and caseworkers
(e.g. in Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, or France). Nevertheless, in contrast to traditional
further training programs that usually last for a couple of months or even several years, the job
search assistance programs are all considerably shorter.
4 Programs’ effects
Two questions lay at the core of this paper. The first is: How effective are job search assistance
programs in European countries in bringing people back to work or shortening the duration of
unemployment? According the answer of the first question, the second question asks: What
determines effective - or respectively - less effective programs? To answer both questions, a
number of complications have to be considered. First, as shown above, programs differ with
regard to eligibility criteria and the contents provided across countries. Therefore, there exists
no ‘the’ job search assistance program. However, by taking account of the single building
blocks of the measures provided, comparison could potentially identify more and less effective
modules and tools. A second complication arises from differences in the evaluation method
used to estimate program effects. As discussed in section 2, the estimators applied to solve the
selection problem - experimental and non-experimental estimators - have different underlying
assumptions that are empirically not testable. Thus, different estimators may lead to different
parameter estimates of treatment effects for the same program. Finally, the studies selected for
this review consider different types of outcome variables. Besides others, the spectrum comprises
transition rates to employment, unemployment rates, matching probabilities, life satisfaction
etc.
Despite these differences, consideration of evaluation studies from 9 different countries, namely
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the
United Kingdom, allows to identify patterns in effects and effectiveness of programs. A summary
of the evaluation studies by country is provided in Table 3. However, comparison of programs
country by country may be afflicted by the problems of the different evaluation methods applied.
For that reason, I will organize the presentation of the empirical results according to the different
estimation methods.
Include Table 3 about here
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4.1 Results from experimental data
Social experiments to evaluate job search assistance programs have been conducted in 7 of
9 European countries reviewed here for which studies are available. Given the aloofness of
European countries against social experiments that existed for a long time, this number provides
interesting evidence that the situation has changed in recent years. The picture of the empirical
results of the impacts of the programs is mixed. With the exception of Gorter and Kalb (1996)
who report negative effects on finding a permanent job for formerly temporary employed job
seekers of a job search assistance program in the Netherlands, all experimental studies establish
no effects or small positive effects of job search assistance programs. What determines these
positive effects? To answer this question, the results are ambiguous to some extent. Good
examples are Denmark and the UK. Although Graversen and van Ours (2008) find positive
effects on the transition rate to employment (conditional on time upon program entry) of the
job search and job activation program, the authors emphasize that not the activities provided are
responsible for the increased transition probability but the threat and punishment job seekers
fear. In a similar way, Dolton and O’Neill (2002) who evaluate the effects of the UK RESTART
program (targeted to long-term unemployed persons) report positive effects for men in terms of
reduced unemployment rates but no effects for women. Here, the authors distinguish short-run
and long-run effects; whereas services provided in programs are responsible for the long-run
results, short-run effects are mainly determined by the associated threat components of the
program.
Other studies reporting positive after program effects do not follow that interpretation. Centeno,
Centeno, and Novo (2006) for Portugal establish positive effects of a program for long-term
unemployed (REAGE) in terms of a shortened duration of unemployment. Positive effects of
a job search assistance program on the reemployment probability and on life satisfaction of
the participants are also found by Vuori and Silvonen (2005) for Finland (Tyho¨no¨n Job Search
Program). Based on a social experiment in Germany, Bu¨ttner (2007) shows that participation
increases the employment rate for young unemployed persons only. Finally, for Hungary where
Micklewright and Nagy (2005) analyze the effects of a job search program on the transition rate
to employment, positive evidence is given for women aged over 30 only.
In contrast to that, for other groups of participants in job search assistance programs no ef-
fects are established. Ha¨ma¨la¨i nen, Uusitalo, and Vuori (2007) who analyze the effects from
two experiments in Finland (one is the same as that analyzed by Vuori and Silvonen, 2005)
cannot establish any significant effects from the experimental estimators, and, therefore, partly
contradict the results of Vuori and Silvonen (2005). Also Bu¨ttner (2007) for Germany reports
zero results for job seekers who participate in internships within the job search assistance pro-
gram. Moreover, in contrast to his positive results for young unemployed persons the evidence
for Hungary (Micklewright and Nagy, 2005) establishes insignificant effects for this group. A
18
similar finding also holds for the so-called INSERJOVEM program in Portugal that is targeted
to young unemployed persons but the analysis of Centeno, Centeno, and Novo (2006) does not
obtain positive results for that group.
In the Netherlands, evidence on a social experiment conducted in 1989/90 is available from
Gorter and Kalb (1996); in addition, another social experiment conducted in 1998/99 has been
evaluated by van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006). Gorter and Kalb (1996) find no or weak
positive effects on the transition rate to employment for persons with a permanent job before;
the results of the program analyzed by van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) are similar
with at best small positive effects on the exit rate to work.
4.2 Results from non-experimental data
In addition to social experiments it is quite common to evaluate treatment effects of programs
based on non-experimental data available for already implemented ALMP programs. To solve
the problem of potential selectivity bias in the estimates, two approaches are mainly used
throughout the empirical studies: propensity score matching estimators and multivariate dura-
tion models. As described above (section 2) both methods differ with regard to data require-
ments and identifying assumptions of the treatment effect. To start with, I will first review the
results obtained from propensity score matching estimators (and related methods) and discuss
the results of duration models thereafter.
Propensity score matching and variants
Job search assistance programs in Germany have been empirically evaluated by Biewen, Fitzen-
berger, Osikominu, and Waller (2007) and Lechner and Wunsch (2008). Both studies apply a
cross-section propensity score matching estimator on administrative data of the Federal Employ-
ment Office. By using the same comprehensive data base, program heterogeneity is considered
in detail in both studies. However, whereas Lechner and Wunsch (2008) compare participants
to non-participants (over the whole period of analysis), Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and
Waller (2007) apply an approach suggested by Sianesi (2004) that defines participation dynam-
ically over the unemployment spell. Here, unemployed persons are defined as non-participants
as long as they do not participate in a program or leave unemployment for work. Therefore, par-
ticipation and non-participation depends on the timing of comparison and effects are compared
between today’s participants and today’s non-participants, who are potentially tomorrow’s par-
ticipants. A further difference of both studies is that Lechner and Wunsch (2008) concentrate on
West Germany only but distinguish different sub-programs of job search assistance (short-term
training measures, short-combined measures, and job search assistance).
The overall picture revealed by Lechner and Wunsch (2008) is more disappointing than the
experimental evidence provided by Bu¨ttner (2007) (for Germany). On average, none of the
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sub-programs considered reveals positive effects in terms of reducing the individual unemploy-
ment rate and job search assistance programs tend to have negative effects on the employment
chances of the participating individuals, too. Nevertheless, some heterogeneity in the effects
is obtained for selected groups of the unemployed. People with a vocational education, long-
term unemployed persons and low-qualified persons experience an increase in the employment
chances due to participation in a combined program that aims at removing specific skill deficits
or in a short-term training program. In contrast to that, the results of Biewen, Fitzenberger,
Osikominu, and Waller (2007) are more positive. Here, contradicting the result by Lechner
and Wunsch (2008) programs provided in West Germany lead to clear positive effects on the
employment rate. In addition, East German programs are not as effective and participants
experience no or only a small increase in the employment chances due to participation.
Since both studies use the same data, a similar estimation approach, and investigate the identi-
cal program the explanation for the different results obtained is given by the different definition
of participation and non-participation. Whereas Lechner and Wunsch (2008) compare partici-
pation to a no-program state, interpretation of the program effect is straightforward. However,
in a comprehensive system of labor market policy programs, participation at different points of
time in the unemployment spell is possible and, therefore, using the no-program state as the
comparison requires conditioning on future outcomes at the time of treatment start. Hence,
the no-program group may be particularly selective with respect to good job chances (i.e. no
activation is required) or bad job chances (i.e. activation is denied due to cream-skimming). In
that sense, the estimated treatment effects may be biased. If one assumes the first of the two
possible directions of bias, the estimates provided are downward biased and would explain the
disappointing findings. To mitigate this problem, Lechner and Wunsch (2008) conduct a pre-
match of participants and non-participants with respect to the distribution of starting dates.
The probability distribution of starting dates in the participants’ group is estimated and is
matched based on observable characteristics to the non-participants’ group. Non-participants
are kept in the analysis based on these estimated potential starting dates. However, this ap-
proach still includes a conditioning on future outcomes since it depends on the time horizon of
the analysis.
In contrast to that, Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Waller (2007) do not have to con-
dition on future outcomes in the analysis as they define participation and non-participation
dynamically. However, this complicates interpretation of the estimates for two reasons. First,
estimated effects could only be interpreted conditional on the timing of treatment start in the
unemployment spell, i.e. the effect of a program that has started in the first quarter of unem-
ployment is different from the effect of a program that has started in the third quarter of un-
employment since the timing of the treatment start in the unemployment spell is interpreted as
an integral part of the program effect. Second, since the comparison requires non-participation
up to the point in time the participants start the program only, the individuals of the compar-
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ison group are likely to participate later in time. Particularly if matching is successful, persons
with comparable participation probabilities will be matched. Hence, program effects may be
compared to postponed entry into programs only. As programs are not counted as employment,
this leads to increased estimates of the treatment effect on average.
For the evaluation of the New Deal for Young People in the UK, Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir,
and van Reenen (2004) use an combination of a difference-in-differences estimator and the
matching estimator as suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998). Here,
matching is used to rule out selectivity in the cross-section; in addition, participants and non-
participants may be affected differently by macroeconomic events. The difference-in-differences
estimator takes account of these time effects that are independent of the program.12 The empir-
ical estimates are positive and complement the picture revealed experimentally by Dolton and
O’Neill (2002) of the RESTART program. With regard to the two outcome variables considered
(share of persons leaving unemployment, outflow into employment) the New Deal program is
effective for men and women. However, it has to be noted that the program is intended to
promote young unemployed persons, whereas the programs in Germany are addressed to all job
seekers. Hence, generalizing the findings of the UK to the whole group of job seekers would
require strong further assumptions.
Multivariate duration models
Multivariate duration models have been applied to evaluate the effects of job search assistance
programs in Austria, France, and Germany. The studies for Austria (Weber and Hofer, 2004a;
2004b) and Germany (Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss, 2006) analyze the effects of programs on the
transition to employment; Cre´pon, Dejemeppe, and Gurgand (2005) for France further take
account of recurrence of unemployment. Similar to Germany, the job search assistance program
in Austria is not targeted to certain groups of unemployed persons. In addition to job counseling
it contains a job application course that should be provided to all job seekers before completing
the first four months of unemployment. As noted above, the job search assistance program in
Germany offers optional short-term training courses to the job seekers as well. The program
used in France has a modular set-up comparable to Germany and includes project support
activities targeted to low-ability unemployed persons.
In contrast to the experimental studies and non-experimental studies using propensity score
matching methods all studies applying multivariate duration models independently of the coun-
try exhibit positive effects of programs on the outcome variables in consideration (except for
one group in Austria). For France, Cre´pon, Dejemeppe, and Gurgand (2005) find positive ef-
fects in terms of a reduced average unemployment duration as well as a lower probability of
unemployment recurrence after participation. The results for Germany by Hujer, Thomsen, and
Zeiss (2006) indicate an increase in the transition rate to employment after participation. In
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addition, individual heterogeneity in the effects shows that job search programs are particularly
effective for low-skilled unemployed men and women. The treatment effect on the hazard rate is
modeled in a flexible way, i.e. it depends not only on the timing of treatment in the unemploy-
ment spell but is allowed to change with time after the start of the program. For this reason,
it is possible to analyze the half-life of treatment effects. The results show that programs affect
the transition rate only in the short- to medium-run after participation, i.e. participants’ hazard
rates increase directly after participation but the effect are diminishing after a couple of months.
Finally, after about one year after the start of program no differences between participants and
non-participants remain. This finding is interpreted as a depreciation of the program’s content
over time; the abilities taught in the courses as well as the value of intensified counseling start
to decrease after participation.
A similar effect is found by Weber and Hofer (2004b) for the Austrian program. Weber and
Hofer (2004a) evaluate the average treatment effect with regard of the timing of treatment
in the unemployment spell, but do not present different program effects conditional on the
preceding unemployment duration. The results indicate a strong positive effect on the hazard
rate to employment. In contrast, Weber and Hofer (2004b) extend the approach by estimating
treatment effects for pre-defined unemployment durations. The detailed analysis shows that only
programs provided during the first year of unemployment have positive effects on shortening
the duration of unemployment; for long-term unemployed persons (with a duration of more
than one year), the effects are reversed and participation prolongs unemployment duration on
average.
4.3 Cost benefit considerations
In contrast to empirical studies of US programs, in evaluation studies of the European programs
cost benefit considerations are scarce. Only three of the studies considered in this review provide
cost benefit analyses, and these are quite short or more or less back-of-the-envelope calculations.
These analyses are limited to costs for the UI system and do not consider social costs and benefits
of programs in addition. Therefore, all cost benefit analyses provided depend strongly on the
estimated individual treatment effects of the programs. For the UK, Dolton and O’Neill (2002)
analyze the cost-benefit relationship of RESTART. Associated with the positive estimates of
the program in terms of reduced unemployment rates, the result shows clear positive effect for
participating men in the long-run (with an estimated gain of 494 British pounds). In contrast to
that, the average short-run gain (for about one year) is negative but not significant (about -24
British pounds), or slightly positive (86 British pounds) but the latter refers to an unrestricted
sample, i.e. job placement in the sample is not only due the RESTART activities. Therefore, the
program seems to be cost-effective for males and tend to be cost-effective for women. Compared
to the results summarized by Meyer (1995), benefits are larger than in the US. In a similar way,
van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) provide a cost benefit analysis on the individual level.
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Programs tend to be cost-effective by saving about 903 Euro on average (but insignificant) if
constant treatment effects over time are assumed. However, the cost analysis provided depends
strongly on the assumptions imposed on the development of the treatment effect over time. In
a different scenario, where a fading out of the treatment effect until 6 months after the start of
the program is assumed, the return shrinks to 56 Euro (and is again insignificant).
In contrast to that, Lechner and Wunsch (2008) for Germany find a negative cost benefit
relationship of participation. Compared to remaining on unemployment benefits, the extra
costs of the program (course costs, tuition, etc.) together with the estimated prolongation of
the unemployment duration of the participants result in costs exceeding the benefits by about
2,000 to 2,500 Euro per participant. Hence, Lechner and Wunsch (2008) rate German job search
assistance programs inefficient from the perspective of the UI system. Nevertheless, compared
to other programs in Germany, these estimates are clearly smaller. However, social costs and
benefits as well as the expected future contributions to social security are not regarded in the
static analysis.
5 Discussion
Job search assistance programs are provided in many countries to improve the reemployment
prospects of unemployed persons and to reduce the budgetary pressure on the unemployment
insurance systems. The empirical evidence for the 9 countries reviewed for which meaningful
empirical studies are available clarifies that several different combinations of services are sub-
sumed in the job search assistance programs. The main differences refer to the type of job
finding services provided, whether or not additional short-term training courses and work-tests
are an integral part of the program, and to the reporting requirements of the job seeker to the
responsible caseworker. Nevertheless, despite this variety quite a number of different approaches
seem to be successful in reaching the intended goals. In addition, since job search assistance
programs improve the matching of workers and jobs, they are unlikely to encourage job seekers
to find a job quickly at the expense of others who are displaced by those in contrast to more
traditional programs.
To allow for a generalization of the empirical effects, it is useful to identify the different effects
these programs exhibit within a theoretical framework. A formal discussion within a job search
model is provided by Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss (2006); for the case at hand, I will refer to the
main implications of that model. On the one hand, job search assistance programs attempt to
improve the job placement on side of the employment agency as well as the self-contained job
search of the participants. On the other hand, programs contain training elements that are used
to adjust the qualification of the job seekers to the demand of the market. By simplifying the
main characteristics of job search assistance programs that way, two channels of how programs
affect the job search could be deduced. With regard to the first channel, one can expect an effect
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on the search behavior of the participants by increasing the intensity as well as the efficiency of
the job search efforts. Hence, job search could be assumed to be more productive leading to a
reduction of unemployment duration. The second channel that teaches job relevant skills may
improve the job opportunities of the participants by allowing them to apply for jobs which are
on average associated with higher wages.
However, both channels do not work in the same direction. Within a search model framework
(see Mortensen, 1986, and van den Berg, 1994) the first channel of providing job search assistance
will have a direct positive effect on the job search efficiency on the one hand. However, an
increased job search efficiency could be translated into a higher job offer arrival rate that
corresponds to an increase in the reservation wage. This increased reservation wage may exhibit
an indirect negative effect on the transition rate to employment on the other hand. Hence,
increasing the job search efficiency directly lowers the unemployment duration of the individual,
but makes the workers more selective with respect to the wage offers at the same time. The
second channel improves the job-relevant skills of the participants, and, therefore, increases
their job opportunities. This is equivalent to a raised productivity. Therefore, participants
could apply for jobs which are on average associated with higher wages. An increased mean of
the wage offer distribution increases the hazard rate of leaving unemployment for employment
since the reservation wage increases by less than the mean of the wage offer distribution. Hence,
for the given higher mean the workers are less selective with respect to the wage offers. Given this
pattern of the two channels of the effects, knowing the impact of a job search assistance program
with regard to employment is impossible ex ante. It dependence on the relative importance of
the two channels in the case analyzed.
By and large, the empirical evidence from social experiments for Europe shows that job search
assistance programs could lead to positive effects in terms of increased employment rates and
reduced unemployment, but not every program is successful. The positive findings are in line
with the experiences of the US (see Meyer, 1995) and support the use of these activities to
activate the unemployed. However, even in cases where no short-term effect of the program
is observable participants’ employment chances seem not to be harmed by participation. Ex-
plaining the success of the programs requires to investigate the relative importance of increased
services (including counseling and the job search programs) and work search requirements in
the determination of the labor market outcomes. Here, the conclusions differ for the US and
the European evidence. For the US, Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Descheˆnes (2005) note that a
stricter verification of the search efforts does not contribute to a decrease in the duration of
unemployment, i.e. the threat of enforcing job search seems to be ineffective. Hence, they argue
that subsidized job search assistance plays the major role for the empirical findings of job search
assistance programs summarized by Meyer (1995). In contrast, for Europe Dolton and O’Neill
(2002) and Graversen and van Ours (2008) relate the positive effects of the programs analyzed
to the threat component in particular.
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The value of experimentally obtained estimates may be affected by the problems described
in section 2. In addition, Meyer (1995) notes that the caseworker at the program sites may
not be representative of the entire pool of service providers. If they differ substantially in
their experience and ability, the difference in outcomes may be biased by this personnel ability.
Nevertheless, since the results from the non-experimental studies complement the findings of
the social experiments, this bias seems to be of minor importance for the empirical results of
job search assistance programs reviewed here.
The picture of the effects of job search assistance programs revealed from the studies apply-
ing variants of propensity score matching estimators is mixed. Whereas some studies establish
clear positive effects, others do find positive effects for selected sub-groups only, or even negative
effects. The non-experimental evidence is complemented by the studies applying multivariate
duration models. The cross-country comparison shows that intensifying counseling activities
and providing job application abilities to job seekers clearly improve the chances of leaving
unemployment for employment. However, the skills provided during short-time courses do not
last very long. Effects of programs therefore diminish over time after participation. In ad-
dition, offering short-courses teaching specific skills and abilities (like in France or Germany)
tend to help low-skilled unemployed persons and long-term unemployed persons in particular.
In contrast, purely supporting job search activities (like in Austria) is a means for short-term
unemployed persons with a high employability only; long-term unemployed persons could ex-
perience a prolonged unemployment duration if no further training of abilities is provided.
How to manage the use of job search assistance programs? An important study that analyzes
this question is provided by Wunsch (2007). She simulates the optimal use of active and passive
labor market policy calibrated to parameters for West Germany taken from Lechner and Wunsch
(2008). A particular focus is laid on the trade-off between the aims of the programs, i.e. ALMP
programs should increase the exit rates to employment by improving job search effectiveness
or skills, and that programs are costly, i.e. course costs usually exceed unemployment benefits
and participation may reduce the time available to actively search for work (locking-in effects).
With regard to the job search assistance programs, the results of the simulation show that
programs should be used early in the unemployment spell as well as after depreciation of the
search effectiveness. In that case, despite the fact that no positive effects could be established
by Lechner and Wunsch (2008), the simulation results suggest that a more-targeted use could
lead to an increase of the exit rate of unemployment of about 2 to 10 percentage points per
half-month of unemployment.
Moreover, she distinguishes certain levels of job search effectiveness of the unemployed. With
regard to that the results of the simulation indicate further that job search assistance programs
should not be used for people with the highest level of search effectiveness; this result, however,
is contradictory to the empirical finding or Weber and Hofer (2004b) for Austria. In addition,
Wunsch (2007) could not recommend the use of job search assistance programs for the lowest
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qualified job seekers since returns to work are too low for that group. Although this seems
contradictory to the finding of Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss (2006) who report particularly strong
effects for low-qualified men and women, it has to be noted that the study does not consider
the cost benefit relationship of the program.
Taking account of the cost benefit relationship of job search assistance programs the simulations
of Wunsch (2007) show that a shortening of the programs to a duration of between one half to
two months may be optimal; moreover, the accumulation rate of job search effectiveness must
exceed 3% per half-month for the job search assistance program to be successful. If that could
be reached budget savings of 3 to 8 percent could be realized compared to an optimal labor
market policy without job search assistance programs. Clearly, the results of Wunsch (2007)
are calibrated to job search assistance programs in West Germany; generalizing the findings to
other countries may reveal different figures.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to condense the findings of the empirical effects of job search assis-
tance programs in Europe. These programs are part of ALMP in many countries and aim at
increasing the employment chances of the unemployed persons by providing assistance with the
job search activities, like an intensified counseling and a frequent reporting of the job search
efforts, and short subsidized courses to enhance the quality of applications but also the skills of
the individuals. Although the programs differ across countries with respect to the spectrum of
services provided and the relative weight associated to the single services, the empirical evidence
for the different programs tends to be quite positive. These positive effects seem to be due to the
improved matching of job seekers and jobs, but also due to the threat component of programs.
This threat component comprises the possibility of the job seeker to be sanctioned by benefit
revocation in case of non-compliance. However, not every program is effective; the empirical
evidence shows that particularly programs that combine a number of different services, e.g.
intensified counseling and job application training, are effective, whereas programs that rely on
a sole intensified counseling only show no or only modest positive effects.
The robustness of the findings is proved by the variety of empirical methods applied. On the
one hand, experimental estimates may lead to consistent estimates of programs’ impacts if
random assignment of participants is conducted carefully. However, social experiments may
suffer from a number of effects related to the experimental situation. Therefore, generalizing
the findings may require strong assumptions. Nevertheless, the majority of the experimental
evidence shows zero or positive effects of job search assistance programs in terms of a reduced
unemployment duration and increased employment rates. This evidence is complemented by a
bulk of studies using non-experimental data; here, variants of propensity score matching meth-
ods and multivariate duration models are used frequently to evaluate the effects of job search
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assistance programs. Framing effects that may apply to social experiments could be excluded
but estimates may suffer from violations of the non-testable identifying assumptions (the lat-
ter would hold for social experiments as well, however, it is more likely that the identifying
assumption holds if randomization is successful). Despite the different methods applied the
non-experimental evidence complements the picture revealed experimentally. Independently of
the country the majority of the job search assistance programs exhibits positive effects on both,
the decrease in the unemployment duration and the increase in the employment rates.
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Notes
1For Germany for example, there exist a number of recent further studies evaluating the effects of job search as-
sistance programs, e.g., Wolff and Jozwiak (2007), Osikominu (2008) and Fitzenberger, Orlyanskaya, Osikominu,
and Waller (2008). However, since they apply similar empirical methods and do not differ much in the results
they establish I refrain from taking account of these.
2The model has been extended for the case of multiple treatments by Lechner (2001) and Imbens (2000).
3Alternatively, in the case of J mutually exclusive treatments (e.g. for the case of evaluating different ALMP
programs), D could be an indicator for the J+1 possible states the individual faces. D could also be R+ := [0,∞),
representing a continuum of doses of some medication, for example (see Abbring, 2003).
4Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) discuss further parameters that may be of interest: for example, the
average effect of treatment (ATE) defined as:
ΔATE = E(Δ) = E(Y 1 − Y 0) = E(Y 1)− E(Y 0).
The ATE computes the difference of the expected outcomes after participation and non-participation. It answers
the question what the impact of treatment would be if individuals are randomly assigned to treatment. However,
for policy implications it is only of minor relevance as persons are included for whom the program was never
intended (Heckman, 1997). Further parameters of interest may be the proportion of people taking the program
who benefit from it, or the increase in the proportion of outcomes above a certain threshold outcome value due
to a policy.
5See Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), for a description of how randomization solves the evaluation
problem.
6The interested reader is referred to the paper of LaLonde (1986) and the responses and extensions by Dehejia
and Wahba (1999; 2002) and Smith and Todd (2005).
7See for example Rubin (1974; 1977; 1979; 1991), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983; 1985), and the overview by
Rosenbaum (2002). However, the idea of matching is not new. Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) note
that the method of matching was first used by Fechner (1860).
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8It has to be noted that the conditional mean independence assumption and the common support condition
are not specific to the matching estimator, but apply to all non-experimental evaluation estimators that condition
on exogenous covariates.
9The idea of conditioning on X to eliminate selection bias may also justify linear regression. However, two
drawbacks of this method relative to matching have to be noted. First, matching is a non-parametric method
and therefore does not require any parametric assumption, like the linearity implicit in linear regression. Second,
matching emphasizes the common support problem, whereas in analyses that estimate impacts simply by running
regressions on X, the issue is rarely even investigated (Smith, 2000a).
10For a further detailed discussion the interested reader is referred to the overviews by Heckman, LaLonde,
and Smith (1999) and Imbens (2004). Furthermore, see Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997;1998) for some
additional estimators and their properties respectively, e.g. kernel matching or local polynomial matching, and
Smith and Todd (2005).
11The alternative treatment at t∗p includes the non-treatment case, see Abbring and van den Berg (2003).
12Participation and non-participation is defined in the classical way similar to Lechner and Wunsch (2008).
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Tables
Table 1: Registration, job-search requirements and ALMP participationa
country benefit en-
titlement
startb
timing of first inten-
sive interviewc
frequency at which
unemployed are
obliged to report job-
search activities
compulsory ALMP
participation after
some set unemploy-
ment durationd
continuing
job-search
require-
ment dur-
ing partic-
ipation in
ALMP
Austria simultane-
ously
often at first inter-
view, with IAP
once a month no no
Denmark simultane-
ously
within a month, with
profiling
at least once every
three weeks
yes, six months for
unemployed under
30 and over 60 years;
nine months else
required
Finland after within a month, with
profiling
from one week to one
month
no required
France before within five (until
2007: eight) days,
with profiling and
IAP
once a month (after
fourth month)
no no
Germany simultane-
ously
usually within 10
days, with profiling
and IAP
depends on profiling
category: on average
six times a year
no required
Hungary simultane-
ously
“as soon as possible”,
with profiling and
IAP
monthly for regular
benefit recipients
no no
Nether-
lands
before
(retrospec-
tive)
at registration, with
profiling
every four weeks yes, one month/six
months (reintegration
trajectory)
–
Portugal simultane-
ously
at registration, with
profiling
variable requirements
(until 2006: not speci-
fied)
no no
United
Kingdom
before within one to three
weeks, with IAP if
profiled is expected to
exhaust UB
every two weeks yes, ten months for
youth, 22 months for
adults (25-49 years)
no
a Source: OECD (2007), Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.5.
b before, simultaneously, after = benefit entitlement starts before/ simultaneously with/ after registration for place-
ment.
c IAP=individual action plan.
d In all countries participation in ALMP is compulsory if unemployed is referred to program by Public Employment
Services.
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